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Reports › Los Angeles County › Across lifelines

Atlas report · Across lifelines · Los Angeles County

How LA's Lifelines Depend on Each Other: Power, Fuel and Money

LA's ten lifelines rest on three shared floors: power, fuel and public money. Gas-fired plants make up 55% of SoCalGas's summer 2026 demand forecast.

Aerial view of the towers of downtown Los Angeles
Photo: Carol M. Highsmith, Library of Congress · Public domain

From the SOS Atlas. Research as of 30 October 2026, from public sources; every figure links to its source.

Lead. Read side by side, Los Angeles County's ten lifelines work less like ten systems than like three shared floors: electricity, liquid fuel and public money, with natural gas underneath electricity. Gas-fired power plants make up 55% of SoCalGas's summer 2026 demand forecast. Diesel and gasoline are the backup for hospitals, data centers, emergency fleets and mass feeding, while LA's refining shrinks and 61% of the crude arrives from abroad. In January 2025 the bulk supplies held, and the failures came in the last mile, in coordination and, for years afterward, on the balance sheets. The links between lifelines are also the least documented part of the public record: 48% of the cross-lifeline dependency links in the SOS Atlas had to be inferred, against 14% of all links.

1. How we read across

The ten sector reports each followed one supply chain upstream: power, water, natural gas, oil and fuels, food and freight, data and communications, hospitals and clinics, emergency services, the Guard and federal help, and public money. This report reads them against each other in four ways.

  1. The network. We counted every link in the Atlas that crosses from one lifeline to another (728 of 1,225), and looked closely at the 77 that say one lifeline depends on or backs up another.
  2. Shared institutions. We counted how many of the ten research teams independently ran into the same organization.
  3. Shared pressures. We lined up the money, prices, federal rules and deadlines that hit more than one lifeline at once.
  4. One real test. We read the January 2025 fires across all ten reports to see what held and what broke.

Two rules from the Atlas apply here too. Every figure links to a public source that someone opened. And this is a resilience atlas, not a targeting map. It describes dependencies the way operators and official plans describe them, at the system level. It does not rank facilities or name weak points that officials have not published.

2. What the network shows

Institutions, not facilities, tie the lifelines together. Of the ten research teams, eight each ran into the County of Los Angeles government and LADWP. Seven ran into the City of Los Angeles government. Six each ran into Southern California Edison and Cal OES. Five each ran into the CPUC, LAFD, FEMA, the County Office of Emergency Management and the Port of Los Angeles. Few physical sites appear in more than two lifelines. LA's lifelines meet mostly through a handful of public agencies and two big utilities, so how those organizations plan, borrow and communicate matters as much as any one pipe or plant.

The dependency links point in a few directions. Of the 77 direct dependency and backup links between lifelines, most fall into four flows:

  • Into electricity. Hospitals, water pumping, data centers, cold storage, port shore power and refineries all depend on the grid.
  • Into natural gas. LADWP's in-basin power plants, SCE-area plants, CAISO's gas-fired fleet and refineries all depend on SoCalGas.
  • Into liquid fuel. Hospital generators, data-center generators, mass-feeding kitchens, port drayage and LAX all depend on refined fuel.
  • Into communications. Every 9-1-1 agency, the public alert systems and CalFresh benefit cards depend on carrier networks.

The joins are the least documented part. Across all 1,225 links, 14% are marked inferred because no opened source stated them. Among the 77 direct dependencies between lifelines, 48% are inferred. Operators publish a lot about their own systems and much less about what they need from each other. Section 8 lists the specific gaps.

3. Seven things the lifelines share

3.1 Electricity is the floor, and natural gas is under it

Everything plugs in.

  • Hospitals. CMS requires hospitals to plan for alternate power to keep patients, alarms and sewage working (42 CFR 482.15).
  • Water. LADWP's pumping stations need power; the state's Palisades memo notes that most critical sites have backup power (state memo, Nov 2025).
  • Ports. The Port of LA reports shore power at 100% of its container and cruise berths (POLA AMP).
  • Food. The Food Bank keeps 40,000 sq ft of coolers and freezers.
  • Shutoffs. When SCE cut power to 515,589 customers in January 2025, the largest shutoff in its history, it de-energized 10,174 critical facilities (CPUC letter, 3 Oct 2025).

Power still runs on gas.

  • LADWP's mix. LADWP is off coal since late November 2025, but 26% of its 2025 supply came from natural gas (LADWP 2025 PCL). Its four in-basin plants burn gas.
  • SoCalGas's biggest summer customer. SoCalGas's summer 2026 forecast puts gas-fired generation at 1,734 MMcf/d out of 3,169, about 55% of the total and more than all core customers, mainly homes and small businesses, combined (729) (Summer 2026 Technical Assessment).
  • Storage. In its 2024 decision on Aliso Canyon, which holds 63% of SoCalGas's storage capacity, the CPUC found the field critical to both gas and electric reliability (Public Advocates).
  • Shortage rules. Under SoCalGas Rule 23, power plants are curtailed before homes in a gas shortage, so a gas problem shows up first as an electricity problem (Rule 23).

The dependency runs both ways, and one direction is unmapped. Gas compression, storage operations and controls need electricity. None of the SoCalGas documents we opened say how much of that load is on grid power or how long its backup lasts. It is a key two-way join that has no public number.

The future leans harder on both floors.

  • Data centers. SCE alone has 4,623 MW of data-center requests (CEC, 2026). That is 71% of LADWP's all-time peak of 6,502 MW and 22% of SCE's own 2025 peak. Requests are not load, and most may never be built.
  • Wider growth. The CEC's 2025 forecast for the CAISO area adds 1.8 GW of data-center load by 2030, as quoted by CAISO (CAISO). SCE expects demand in its territory to nearly double between 2025 and 2045 (EIX 10-K). Port electrification and zero-emission vehicles (18.9% of new California car sales in Q4 2025) add to it.
  • LADWP's pipeline. LADWP did not send data-center figures to the CEC's survey, so the City's own pipeline is a blank.

Meanwhile the local rules that would shrink gas demand moved backward. The City repealed its all-electric building ordinance in October 2025 (City of LA). South Coast AQMD rejected zero-emission appliance targets in June 2025 (CalMatters). New LNG exports from Baja California may pull up to 425 MMcf/d of Southern Zone supply at peak (Summer 2026 Technical Assessment). The CPUC decision on Aliso Canyon's future is unlikely before 2027.

What it means. In summer, gas is less the fuel that keeps LA homes warm than the fuel that keeps LA's power steady; in winter, when SoCalGas peaks, homes come first. Decisions about gas storage, pipelines and appliance rules are therefore electricity decisions too, and through electricity they are hospital, water and communications decisions.

3.2 Liquid fuel is everyone's backup, and it is getting scarcer and more imported

Backup power means diesel. When the grid fails, nearly every lifeline falls back on stored fuel.

  • Hospitals. By 2030 hospitals must hold 72 hours of generator fuel and water on site under California's non-structural seismic standard (Hanson Bridgett).
  • Data centers. Colocation sites keep standby generators.
  • Mass feeding. The City's mass-feeding plan lists diesel and gasoline for generators and vehicles as a planning need (City of LA EMD, 2020).
  • Fleets and freight. Engines, ambulances and aircraft run on refined fuel. So do the drayage trucks and locomotives that move port cargo.
  • LAX. The airport gets its jet fuel by pipeline from the El Segundo and Torrance refineries and harbor terminals.

How much diesel all these generators hold countywide is not public.

The supply behind that backup is narrowing.

  • Refining share. LA County holds about two-thirds of California's refining, 893,800 b/d of 1,338,171 (CEC refinery list).
  • Closures. Two closures, Phillips 66 Los Angeles in October 2025 and Valero Benicia in April 2026, removed about 17% of the state's capacity.
  • Imports. In 2025, 61.1% of the crude supplied to California refineries was foreign (CEC supply sources). UC Giannini Foundation economists warn that heavier reliance on imports without more import capacity leaves the market more exposed to shocks (Giannini, Feb 2026).
  • State rules. The state's minimum-inventory rule is still not adopted, and the resupply rule is still open. The CEC holds a resupply workshop on 9 November 2026 (CEC).

Refineries themselves sit on the other two floors. Refineries need grid power, and they need natural gas for process heat and hydrogen. Under Rule 23 they are noncore customers, curtailed before homes. A long gas or power disruption therefore reaches the fuel that everyone's backup generators run on. Officials describe these links in general terms. We have not modelled them, and we mark the supplier links as inferred.

What the price data actually says. LA gasoline was up 30.8% year over year in September 2026, against 2.8% for food and 3.7% for all items. LA energy prices overall were up 20.3% (BLS).

It is tempting to pin all of that on the closures, but the annual averages suggest caution. California's average rose from $4.41 a gallon in 2025 to $5.36 so far in 2026, a 95¢ rise. The national average rose 76¢ over the same period, from $3.10 to $3.86. California's premium over the nation widened by about 19¢, from $1.31 to $1.50 (USGasGauge, EIA weekly data). So about 76¢ of the 95¢ rise was matched nationally, and the premium widened by about 19¢. That is consistent with a closure effect but does not prove one. Two cautions: the US series is derived by the source from the California price minus a rounded gap, and 2026 covers only 43 weeks against a full 2025. A comparison using EIA's own series would be more reliable.

3.3 One harbor carries three lifelines

San Pedro Bay is where three lifelines come ashore.

  • Fuel. About 80% of El Segundo's crude arrives by tanker (Chevron), and Torrance draws waterborne crude through the LA and Long Beach harbors.
  • Goods and food. The two ports moved about 20.1 million TEUs in 2025, which ACTA puts at about 39.6% of U.S. waterborne imports. The Alameda Corridor carries about 31% of their loaded containers inland (ACTA).
  • Relief. The state's catastrophic earthquake plan names the Ports of LA and Long Beach as entry points for federal relief logistics (2010 OPLAN).

The same harbor also draws on the floors above. Shore power comes from the grid, drayage trucks and locomotives burn diesel, and five LAFD stations cover the Port of LA area, four of them with fireboat capability.

Money follows the boxes. Trade shocks reach the docks within weeks. In the week around 6 May 2025 the Port of LA expected cargo down 35% from a year earlier after new tariffs (NPR); May finished 5% down, with imports down 9% (POLA, 13 Jun 2025). ACTA budgeted a 14.7% fall in corridor fee revenue for FY2025-26, and the Port of LA is planning on 7% lower container volume. A trade dispute is therefore also a fuel-import question, a relief-logistics question and a port-finance question at once.

3.4 Water and power are one utility, one balance sheet and one lawsuit

LADWP runs both the City's power and its water, with 1,894 shared "Joint System" positions (LADWP Water board letter). The two systems are tied physically, financially and legally.

Physically, a dry year hits both.

  • Snowpack. The Eastern Sierra snowpack was 24% of normal in 2026. The Los Angeles Aqueduct is now expected to cover about 40% of City demand in 2026-27, down from about 49% in FY2024-25 (LADWP).
  • Hydro. LADWP's 14 small hydro plants run on aqueduct flows, so the same drought cuts a slice of its power.
  • Imports. The gap is filled with water from MWD, whose imports are among the most energy-hungry in the state. The State Water Project is California's single biggest electricity user (E&E News, Apr 2026). Its Edmonston pumping plant alone uses about 40% of the project's power (Water Education Foundation), and the Colorado River Aqueduct climbs 1,617 feet through five pumping plants (MWD District at a Glance).
  • Colorado River. From 2027 California's share of the federal Colorado River cut would be 440,000 acre-feet if the states implement their proposed agreement (Interior), and MWD holds junior rights.

Financially, the same shock hits both.

  • Ratings. In January 2025 S&P cut LADWP's power bonds from AA- to A and its water bonds from AA+ to AA-. On 3 March 2026 (reported 4 March) Moody's lowered the City, LADWP power and LADWP water together. That one action covered about $5 billion of City debt, $12.8 billion of power debt and $6 billion of water debt, together about $23.8 billion by our sum. Moody's gave three reasons: weaker fiscal 2025 results, possible Palisades Fire judgments and LADWP's growing capital program (Bond Buyer, Mar 2026).
  • Lawsuits. The Palisades lawsuits allege failings in both the water system and the power lines. The City and LADWP agreed in August 2026 to go to mediation, while the City denies liability (Westside Current, Aug 2026).

And the City budget stands on the power bill. The City's General Fund gets roughly $0.8 billion a year from LADWP electricity customers: the Power Revenue Transfer of about $220–228 million plus $554–574 million of utility users tax. That is about 9% of the proposed $8.59 billion General Fund for FY2026-27 (the transfer itself is proposed at $219.7 million that year). In 2025 LADWP also transferred $219.3 million of surplus to rebuild City reserves. A weaker LADWP therefore means a weaker General Fund, which pays for police and fire.

3.5 Money moves the shock, from January 2025 to 2031

The fires were a week-long event. Their money effects run for years, and the same people carry them in several roles.

Ratepayers across LA's two big utility territories are paying for four things at once:

  1. Fire liability. SCE customers fund the state Wildfire Fund through a bill charge. SB 254 adds $18 billion, half of it from extending that charge by ten years (Nossaman, Sep 2025). City ratepayers carry LADWP's Palisades exposure, for which no official estimate was found.
  2. Rebuilding and hardening. SCE plans $4.6 billion of wildfire capital in 2026–2030. LADWP's power capital plan reaches $20.4 billion through 2031.
  3. The clean-energy transition. LA100's pathway projects LADWP's average rate at 44.1¢/kWh in 2030, against a system rate of 28.6¢ in December 2024. KBRA's range for 2030 is 30–42¢ (KBRA; LA100 deck).
  4. The borrowing to do it. About $14.1 billion of LADWP power's $20.4 billion is planned debt, or 69% (KBRA, May 2026). LADWP water's capital spending more than doubles to over $1.8 billion a year by FY2029, about two-thirds of it debt-funded. SCE plans $37.5–40.6 billion of capital in 2026–2030, raising its rate base to $50.8–67.9 billion (Edison 10-Q).

Water bills move in the same direction.

  • MWD. MWD's treated Tier 1 rate rose 21.7% from 2024 to 2026, to $1,528 an acre-foot (MWD District at a Glance), with 6.2% more on 1 January of each of 2027 and 2028 (MWD, Apr 2026).
  • LADWP water. LADWP's water rates rose about 23.6% in FY2025.
  • Burbank. Burbank Water and Power proposed electric increases of 9.9% in each of 2026 and 2027.

The County is solvent but spending one-time money. The County kept AAA (Fitch) and Aa1 (Moody's) in June 2026, while flagging nearly $5 billion of AB 218 settlement costs. Health Services is covering a $662.2 million cut in federal support with $743.6 million of one-time fund balance (Westside Current, Apr 2026). One-time money covers a gap once. It does not close it.

3.6 Federal rules hit hospitals and food at the same time

Two lifelines depend most on federal money, and both are losing it at once.

Health.

  • Dependence. About 70% of Health Services' roughly $6.5 billion budget is federal (SMDP, Aug 2025). Community health centers get 60% of their revenue from Medi-Cal. At MLK Community Hospital, 95% of emergency visits are Medi-Cal, Medicare or uninsured patients.
  • Losses. The County's February 2026 Board motion projects more than $1 billion of County health care cuts from H.R. 1, and DHS federal revenue losses above $700 million a year (Board motion).
  • Enrollment. Medi-Cal enrollment in the county fell by more than 120,000 between July and November 2025 (same Board motion). Work requirements could remove more than 700,000 more by FY2027-28 (SMDP).

Food.

  • Caseload. About 1.5 million county residents were on CalFresh in mid-2026. About 108,000 had lost benefits since H.R. 1 was signed, and the County projects about 260,000 at risk (LA Public Press, Jun 2026).
  • Food insecurity. One in four county households was food insecure in 2025, against a national rate of 14% (USC Dornsife).
  • Shutdown. When the November 2025 federal shutdown delayed benefits for about 1 million LA County households, the Food Bank's reach rose above 1 million people a month (LARFB 2025).
  • County match. The County added $40.1 million a year to match CalFresh.

Disaster money.

  • What came. Federal support for the 2025 fires passed $3 billion within five months, and most of it was SBA loans rather than grants: more than $2.9 billion of loans against about $136 million of FEMA individual assistance (FEMA, 6 Jun 2025).
  • What didn't. California asked Congress for nearly $40 billion in February 2025. On 20 July 2026, four senators wrote to Senate appropriators that the administration's 24 June 2026 supplemental request "did not include a request for additional disaster recovery funding" (Padilla et al., Jul 2026). We found no enacted LA-fire supplemental.

What it means. The safety-net hospitals and the food banks are being asked to absorb more people just as their federal funding shrinks, and the long-term disaster money has not arrived. Medi-Cal and CalFresh both serve low-income residents, but no public source gives LA's overlap between the two, so we cannot say how many households are hit by both.

3.7 Communications is the nervous system, and power is why it fails

Everything reports through it.

  • 9-1-1. Every 9-1-1 call to LAPD, LAFD, the Sheriff and County Fire, and every EMS dispatch, runs over the 9-1-1 network (Cal OES, 2026).
  • Alerts. Public alerts reach phones through carriers.
  • Hospitals. Hospitals report bed status over ReddiNet.
  • Benefits. CalFresh arrives on electronic cards.

What fails is usually the power.

  • October 2019. In a statewide wildfire and shutoff episode, mostly in PG&E territory, whose FCC reporting area included LA County, 351 of the 476 cell sites counted as down (74%) had lost power. Another 83 had lost transport links and 24 were damaged (Inside Towers, 2019).
  • January 2025. Verizon's remaining outages on 13 January came from power lost during the shutoffs and from burned fiber (Verizon, 2025).
  • Backup. Statewide in 2023, 28% of towers in fire-threat areas lacked 72 hours of backup power. We found no LA County figure.

And the software and the human chain can fail too. On 9 January 2025 an evacuation alert, correctly targeted when it left the County's emergency operations center, reached nearly 10 million residents countywide and kept echoing (County of LA, 2025). The County-commissioned review found no single cause but a chain of outdated policies, inconsistent practices and communication gaps (McChrystal Group for LA County).

The next upgrade is mid-flight. Next Generation 9-1-1 migrations resume in fall 2026. Cal OES aims to switch LA-area answering points before the 2028 Olympics, with all of them due by December 2029. Cal OES itself warns the timeline may shift.

4. January 2025, read across: what held and what broke

The fires were the closest thing LA has had to a full test of its lifelines together. Reading the ten reports side by side gives a clear pattern.

LifelineWhat heldWhat bent or broke
WaterRegional storage was healthy: big Southern California reservoirs were 77–97% full, and the state released an extra 220 cfs from Castaic to lift LADWP pressure (state memo).Flow, not supply, was the limit. LADWP pushed 37,000 gpm, its maximum and about four times normal. Three local tanks were effectively empty by early 8 January, and crews closed about 4,800 leaking service points. Santa Ynez Reservoir was empty for repairs (LADWP preliminary report); full, it could have added about 15% and would still have been overwhelmed (state memo).
PowerLADWP's in-basin gas plant at Scattergood supplied firm local power (Power Engineering).SCE shut off 515,589 customers, the longest outage lasting 15 days, and de-energized 10,174 critical facilities. CAL FIRE lists the Eaton Fire's cause as "Electrical" (CAL FIRE).
CommunicationsThe FCC Chair called the countywide impact "minimal so far" around 10 January.The countywide false-reach alert on 9 January. Cell outages came from shutoff power loss and burned fiber. LAFD's review found radio and network coordination problems (LAFD AARR).
HospitalsHospitals countywide stayed open, and Adventist Health Glendale evacuated no patients (Becker's).UCLA Health closed 11 clinics, partly because of utility shutoffs. Staff were displaced, and procedures were postponed.
Food and freightNo public report of the fires disrupting the ports or major distribution centers.Demand surged: the Food Bank distributed 23.5 million lbs for disaster response.
Emergency and GuardMutual aid worked as designed. More than 1,800 Guard members served (U.S. Army), Texas sent firefighters under the state-to-state compact, and MAFFS aircraft flew retardant missions.LAFD's review says the residential water system was not designed for a wind-driven fire of the Palisades' scale, and apparatus out for repair limited resources.
MoneyThe state approved $2.5 billion in January 2025, and federal support passed $3 billion by June.Downgrades: S&P in January and April 2025, Moody's in March 2026. Litigation followed, and most federal aid came as loans. The $40 billion request remains unmet as far as found.

Three lessons cut across the table.

  1. The supply chains held, and the last mile failed. Regional reservoirs were 77–97% full, the ports kept moving and the food bank scaled up. What failed was local: pipe and pump capacity in hillside neighbourhoods, alerts that went too wide, and clinics closed partly because of utility shutoffs.
  2. A safety measure was itself a cross-lifeline shock. SCE's shutoffs de-energized 10,174 critical facilities, a cross-lifeline effect on a scale we found for no other single January event. Shutoffs reduce ignition risk, which is why utilities use them. But the decision to cut power is also a decision about clinics, cell towers and water pumps. The utility notifies public-safety partners and critical facilities, but the decision and its timing remain the utility's. SCE is now hardening named circuits, building 7-day wind forecasts by November 2026 and enrolling Medical Baseline customers monthly for shutoff notice by 31 December 2026 (SCE 2026 PSPS Action Plan).
  3. The money is the longest aftershock. Twenty-one months later, the fire's effects still show up in credit ratings, lawsuits, rate plans and unmet federal requests.

One loose end is still open. As of 10 September 2026, Santa Ynez Reservoir was dry again, this time for a $19.5 million floating-cover replacement (News Tribune, Apr 2026). LADWP told the Westside Current that it will return to service by December 2026 (Westside Current, Sep 2026); earlier estimates said fall 2026, and the state memo lists full cover replacement as due by May 2027. Either way it is offline into December, during the Santa Ana season.

5. What a bigger test would look like

The fires burned about 40,000 acres. The state's planning scenario for a magnitude 7.8 southern San Andreas earthquake covers 12 counties (Cal OES SCCEP). It expects:

  • 325 hospitals below 50% function on day one;
  • 2.25 million people displaced;
  • 177,858 injured survivors;
  • about $232 billion in initial economic loss.

The same plan cites a 99.7% chance of an M6.7+ quake somewhere in California within 30 years.

Three lifelines are racing that clock separately:

  • Hospitals face the 1 January 2030 seismic deadline, and only about 45% statewide were on track in late 2025.
  • LADWP has installed 67.2 miles of earthquake-resistant pipe since 2012.
  • The aqueducts that cross the San Andreas were flagged for protection in the City's 2014 Resilience by Design plan.

An earthquake would test all ten lifelines at once, and the federal response chain behind them, in a way the fires did not.

6. The squeeze on households

These figures come from different sources and periods, so they are side by side, not added up.

LifelineWhat a household seesSource
GasolineUp 30.8% year over year (Sep 2026); California averages $5.36 against $3.86 nationally in 2026BLS; USGasGauge/EIA
Energy overallUp 20.3% year over year (Sep 2026)BLS
Electricity (LADWP)System rate 28.6¢/kWh (Dec 2024), projected 30–42¢ by 2030 (KBRA) or 44.1¢ on the LA100 pathwayKBRA; LADWP
Electricity (Burbank)+9.9% proposed for 2026 and again for 2027BWP
Water (LADWP)About +23.6% in FY2025KBRA
Water (wholesale)MWD treated rate +21.7% 2024–26, +6.2% in 2027 and 2028MWD
Gas (SoCalGas)Typical non-CARE bill $71.10 → $73.58 a month from February 2025CPUC
FoodUp 2.8% (Sep 2026), but one in four households food insecureBLS; USC Dornsife
Food aid and coverageCalFresh and Medi-Cal losses under H.R. 1LA Public Press; County

The pattern is not general inflation. LA prices overall rose 3.7% in the year to September 2026. The pressure is concentrated in energy and utilities, and it is set to continue, because the capital plans in section 3.5 have to be paid back through bills. For a household that is also losing CalFresh or Medi-Cal, the lifelines tighten from both sides.

7. The convergence calendar, 2026–2031

Deadlines from the ten reports, put on one timeline. Each is planned by a different agency, but they land on the same region, the same ratepayers and often the same staff.

WhenWhat landsLifelines
Nov 2026CEC fuel-resupply workshop (9 Nov); possible Aliso Canyon hearings; SCE 7-day wind forecastsOil, gas, power
Fall 2026NG9-1-1 migrations resumeData, emergency
Dec 2026Santa Ynez Reservoir expected back (per LADWP); SCE monthly Medical Baseline enrollment for shutoff noticeWater, power, health
2027Colorado River cut (California 440,000 AF if the states' agreement is implemented); MWD +6.2%; Eaton bellwether trials (Jan, May, Sep, with SCE asking to move January to June); Aliso decision; SB 1221 decarbonization pilotsWater, finance, power, gas
FY2027-28Medi-Cal work requirements; MWD +6.2% (Jan 2028)Health, food, water
2028Olympic and Paralympic Games, with LA's 9-1-1 switch targeted before them; hospital NPC building permits due 1 Mar; a new El Segundo cable landing stationEmergency, data, health
2029Scattergood replacement (30% hydrogen design) targeted for year-end; all 9-1-1 answering points on NG9-1-1 by Dec; Western Gateway pipeline target; LADWP water capital above $1.8B a yearPower, gas, data, oil, water
2030 (hospital deadline 1 Jan)Hospital seismic deadline, including 72 hours of on-site water and fuel; LA100's 80% renewable goal; legacy 9-1-1 retired; CEC forecast of 1.8 GW more data-center load in the CAISO areaHealth, water, oil, power, data
2030–31Aliso Canyon possibly not needed if upgrades are finished and demand falls (CPUC staff preview); LADWP power capital plan horizonGas, power, finance

The years 2028 to 2030 are crowded. The Olympics, the 9-1-1 rebuild, the hospital deadline, the Scattergood rebuild and LA100's first big milestone all land within about 24 months, on top of the rate and borrowing increases already underway.

8. Where the public record is thinnest

These are the joins between lifelines that no opened public source quantifies. The figures that matter are aggregate and system-level, not site lists. The point is to know whether the interfaces are covered, not where they are.

InterfaceWhat is not publicWho could publish an aggregate
Gas ← powerHow much gas compression and storage runs on grid power, and backup durationSoCalGas, CPUC
Emergency ← power and fuelBackup power and fuel for 9-1-1 and dispatchCity EMD, County OEM, Cal OES
Everyone ← dieselCountywide generator fuel held, as a total or a share meeting 72 hoursCounty OEM, CEC
Hospitals ← water, fuel and gasesShare of LA hospitals meeting the 72-hour NPC standard; medical-gas supply resilience; licensed bedsHCAI, CDPH, EMS Agency
Data centers ← power, water and fuelLADWP's data-center pipeline; data-center water use and generator fuelLADWP, CEC
Water ← suppliesTreatment chemical and membrane supply chainsLADWP, MWD
Water ↔ powerEnergy use of LADWP pumping and of wastewater treatment, in MWhLADWP, LASAN, LACSD
Cell networks ← powerLA County count of fire-zone towers without 72-hour backupCPUC
Food ← portsFood and reefer tonnage through the ports; days of food supply held in the countyPorts, USDA, County
Federal → recoveryFEMA Public Assistance obligations for DR-4856, by recipientFEMA, OpenFEMA

9. What residents can do

  • Plan for the floors, not just the lifelines. Most home failures come down to power, then fuel, then communications. A charged battery pack, a radio that works without cell service, and a plan for medicines that need refrigeration cover more lifelines than any single kit.
  • Register where the utilities let you. If someone at home depends on powered medical equipment, enroll in your utility's Medical Baseline or life-support program so you get shutoff notice (see our power report).
  • Sign up for both alert systems. NotifyLA (City) and Alert LA County are separate.
  • Check benefits before they lapse. Medi-Cal and CalFresh renewals and work rules are changing. The County's DPSS and the LA Regional Food Bank list help.
  • Watch the deadlines that set your bills. The LA100 plan cycle, LADWP rate actions, MWD budgets and the CPUC's Aliso Canyon proceeding are all public and take comment.

10. Verdict

What the evidence supports. Los Angeles does not have ten separate lifelines. It has three shared floors that the others stand on: electricity, liquid fuel and public money. Natural gas sits under electricity, and communications carries the signals between them all. The bulk supply chains are deep and held up well in the one real test LA has had. The weak places are the local last mile, the joins between lifelines and the balance sheets that pay for all of it.

What is uncertain. We cannot say how much backup any lifeline has when another fails, because the interfaces are where the public record is thinnest. We had to infer nearly half of the cross-lifeline dependencies in the Atlas. Some of that is reasonable caution by operators. Some of it is simply that no agency's job is to publish the whole picture.

Our grade. On supply, LA is in better shape than the "big one coming" mood suggests: regional storage was 77–97% full in January 2025, the ports kept moving and mutual aid worked. On coordination and money, it is more fragile than any single lifeline report shows. Between now and 2030, the same ratepayers, the same County and the same few agencies have to absorb:

  • fire liability;
  • the clean-energy rebuild;
  • the hospital seismic deadline;
  • the 9-1-1 rebuild and the Olympics;
  • Colorado River cuts;
  • federal health and food cuts.

Each is planned on its own track. We found no joint plan. If one thing would make LA more resilient, it is a shared, public, regularly refreshed view of how the lifelines depend on each other, at the system level and safe to publish. That is what this Atlas is trying to be.

Questions people ask

What do Los Angeles's lifelines depend on most?

Read together, LA County's ten lifelines rest on three shared floors: electricity, liquid fuel and public money, with natural gas under electricity. Gas-fired power plants make up 55% of SoCalGas's summer 2026 demand forecast.

How did the January 2025 power shutoffs affect hospitals and other critical facilities?

When SCE cut power to 515,589 customers in January 2025, the largest shutoff in its history, it de-energized 10,174 critical facilities. Hospitals countywide stayed open, but UCLA Health closed 11 clinics, partly because of utility shutoffs.

What are the lessons of the January 2025 fires for LA's lifelines?

The supply chains held and the last mile failed: regional reservoirs were 77–97% full and the ports kept moving, but local pipe and pump capacity, alerts and some clinics fell short. The money effects, from credit downgrades to lawsuits and unmet federal requests, are the longest aftershock.

How well documented are the links between LA's lifelines?

Poorly. Among the 77 direct dependency and backup links between lifelines, 48% had to be inferred because no opened public source stated them, against 14% of all 1,225 links.

Sources

  1. Cornell LII, 42 CFR 482.15 (CMS emergency preparedness)
  2. CalEPA, Palisades Fire and water supply analysis (Nov 2025)
  3. Port of Los Angeles, Alternative Maritime Power (shore power)
  4. CPUC, letter to SCE on its PSPS program (Oct 2025)
  5. LADWP, 2025 Power Content Label
  6. SoCalGas, Summer 2026 Technical Assessment
  7. CPUC Public Advocates Office, Aliso Canyon decision commentary (Dec 2024)
  8. SoCalGas, Rule 23 (curtailment)
  9. CEC, data center methodology memo (2026)
  10. CAISO, large load issue paper (Jan 2026)
  11. Edison International, Form 10-K, 2025
  12. City of LA, Ordinance 188716 (all-electric repeal)
  13. CalMatters, AQMD rejects gas appliance phaseout (Jun 2025)
  14. Hanson Bridgett, California health law newsletter (Spring 2026)
  15. City of LA EMD, Mass Care Feeding Appendix (2020)
  16. CEC, California's oil refineries
  17. CEC, Oil supply sources to California refineries
  18. UC Giannini Foundation, Can imports stabilize California gasoline prices? (Feb 2026)
  19. CEC, resupply rulemaking workshop (Nov 2026)
  20. BLS, Consumer Price Index, Los Angeles area
  21. USGasGauge, California gas price history (EIA weekly data)
  22. Chevron, El Segundo refinery overview
  23. ACTA, 2026 program and operating budget
  24. Cal EMA/FEMA, SoCal Catastrophic Earthquake Response Plan (2010 OPLAN)
  25. NPR, Los Angeles port and tariffs (May 2025)
  26. Port of Los Angeles, May 2025 cargo (13 Jun 2025)
  27. LADWP, FY2026-27 Water budget board letter and resolution
  28. LADWP News, 2026-27 water supply forecast
  29. E&E News, California's largest power user (Apr 2026)
  30. Water Education Foundation, Edmonston Pumping Plant
  31. MWD, District at a Glance (2024)
  32. U.S. Department of the Interior, 2027-2028 Colorado River operations
  33. The Bond Buyer, Moody's downgrades Los Angeles (Mar 2026)
  34. Westside Current, City and LADWP agree to mediate Palisades lawsuits (Aug 2026)
  35. Nossaman, SB 254 overview (Sep 2025)
  36. KBRA, LADWP rating report
  37. LADWP, LA100 Advisory Group kickoff deck (Aug 2026)
  38. KBRA, LADWP power report (May 2026)
  39. Edison International, Form 10-Q, Q3 2026
  40. MWD, Board adopts two-year budget (Apr 2026)
  41. Westside Current, County unveils $48.8B budget (Apr 2026)
  42. Santa Monica Daily Press, LA County faces federal cuts (Aug 2025)
  43. LA County Board of Supervisors motion (Feb 2026)
  44. LA Public Press, CalFresh cuts (Jun 2026)
  45. USC Dornsife, food and nutrition insecurity in LA County
  46. LA Regional Food Bank, 2025 annual report
  47. FEMA, LA County wildfire recovery over $3 billion (6 Jun 2025)
  48. Sen. Padilla et al., letter to appropriators on the June 2026 supplemental (Jul 2026)
  49. Cal OES, NG 9-1-1 legislative report (Feb 2026)
  50. Inside Towers, cell site outages (2019)
  51. Verizon, 2025 wildfire updates
  52. LA County, emergency alert problems (Jan 2025)
  53. McChrystal Group for LA County, after-action review
  54. LADWP, Palisades Fire water system preliminary report (Jul 2025)
  55. Power Engineering, Scattergood hydrogen transition
  56. CAL FIRE, Eaton Fire incident page
  57. LAFD, Palisades Fire after-action review report (Oct 2025)
  58. Becker's Hospital Review, hospitals and California wildfires
  59. U.S. Army, National Guard fights California wildfires (Jan 2025)
  60. SCE, 2026 PSPS Action Plan
  61. News Tribune, Palisades reservoir (Apr 2026)
  62. Westside Current, Santa Ynez Reservoir dry again (Sep 2026)
  63. Cal OES, Southern California Catastrophic Earthquake Plan fact sheet

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How this report was made

Each report is written from public records: utility filings, government budgets and reviews, regulators and official data. Every figure links to the source that states it, and a second reader checks the figures before a report goes up. Reports describe how systems work and depend on each other, the way official plans do; they never map weak points. First published 9 November 2026. SOS.city is not an emergency service: in an emergency, call 911.